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2 This is taken to be the explanation of intentional actions by reasons.
3 In «Actions, Reasons and Causes» (1963) Davidson says: «A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see somet-
hing the agent saw, or thought he saw, in his action – some feature, consequence, or aspect of the action the agent wan-
ted, desired, prized, held dear, thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory, or agreeable.» In «Intending» (1978) he says, «To
serve as reasons for an action, beliefs and desires need not be reasonable, but a normative element nevertheless enters,
since the action must be reasonable in the light of the beliefs and desires…»
4 Clearly, Davidson’s views changed over time, but I will here concentrate on his 1963 view. Although there is no exege-
tical treatment here of such later work as his 1978 paper «Intending» nor of his 1987 paper «Problems in the Explanation
of Action», the argument of this paper applies equally forcefully against his views expressed in these later papers.
Demonstrating this goes well beyond what I can discuss here. 
Abstract: It is widely assumed that action
explanation renders intentional actions rationally
intelligible in light of an agent’s beliefs and
desires. Donald Davidson shares this assumption.
However, I argue that his theory of action
explanation fails to accommodate this feature of
action explanation. Moreover, this failure offers
strong reasons to abandon causalism about action
explanation.
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Resumen: Suele suponerse que la explicación de
las acciones hace a las acciones intencionales
inteligibles racionalmente a la luz de las creencias
y deseos del agente. Donald Davidson comparte
este supuesto. Sin embargo, defenderé este rasgo
de la explicación de la acción no encuentra aco-
modo en su teoría de la explicación de las accio-
nes. Más aún, este insuficienca proporciona
razones poderosas para abandonar el causalismo
sobre la explicación de las acciones.
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Introduction1
Donald Davidson, among others, plausibly assumes that rationalization2 renders an intentional
action rationally intelligible in light of the reasons on which the agent acted.3 With this assumption
in mind, it seems that one task of a theory of rationalization is to provide an account of how
rationalization makes intentional actions rationally intelligible. In the following, I will argue that
although Davidson acknowledges the central role of rational intelligibility to rationalization, his
view4 does not provide an analysis of rationalization that accounts for this feature. 
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5 I will sometimes talk about explanation as «tracking» things. I follow Kim in this usage. I assume that explanation has an
epistemic and a metaphysical component, where the former consists of statements that describe the latter in a special
explanatory kind of way. On these minimal and widely accepted assumptions, I am going to help myself to the notion of
«tracking» to capture the dependence of the epistemic component of explanation on the metaphysical component.  For
discussion of these and related issues, see Kim 1994, 1999.
6 The explanans phenomenon is that which does the explaining, the explanandum phenomenon is that phenomenon that is
being explained.
7 I will maintain a realist view of explanation throughout. Roughly, explanatory realism is the view that there are features
independent of the descriptive component of the explanation that are «mapped» or tracked by the description. Explana-
tion is not just a matter of «internal» relations among propositions. See Kim, 1987.
8 Of course, much more needs to be said to show why causation is explanatory.
In Section 1, I will discuss the widely accepted view that rationalization tracks5 «motivating
reasons». These are psychological states of the agent, especially beliefs and desires. I argue that we
face a dilemma: either rationalization tracks motivating reasons or it tracks normative reasons. If
the former, then rationalization does not necessarily make intentional actions rationally intelligible,
if the latter, then it is obscure how rationalization works in cases where reasons that lack
justificatory force in fact are nevertheless explanatory. 
In Section 2, I motivate what, I believe, is the most plausible path out of the dilemma. My claims
in this section do not amount to a theory of rationalization, nor do I offer a solution to the problem
raised in Section 1. These remarks are intended as a broad outline of the kind of solution that must
be offered to the problems discussed earlier in the paper.
Section 1: The Appeal of Motivating Reasons
It is widely assumed that rationalization renders an intentional action rationally intelligible in
light of the reason that justified the action. This assumption simply reflects how rationalization
appears to work in everyday contexts. By examining such contexts, we can show that, typically, we
do not take ourselves to have successfully completed the rationalizing project until we come to see
that the agent was, in some sense, rationally justified in undertaking what she did undertake to do.
Suppose that I see you open the window and am told that the reason why you are doing that is
because you want to cool the room. Now, suppose that I believe that it is hotter outside than inside,
and do not believe of the window-opening that it is a good means to the end of cooling the room.
In such circumstances, I may be puzzled as to why you would open a window to achieve your end.
My puzzlement indicates that the expectation in rationalization is that we come to see the agent’s
action as rationally intelligible in means-end terms. In fact, it is highly usual in such circumstances
to pursue the rationalizing enquiry by asking why it is that you are opening the window, given that
it is hotter outside than inside. Let’s suppose that I discover that you didn’t know that it is hotter
outside than inside. With this information about your beliefs, it seems that I can see why, given what
you took to be the case, you thought that opening the window was a good means to cooling the
room. 
An important aim of any theory of explanation is to isolate what it is about the relationship
between the explanans phenomenon and the explanandum phenomenon that allows the former to
explain the latter.6 7 For example, we might ask what it is about the relationship between a baseball
flying through the air at a certain speed and the breaking of a window that results in the fact that the
former event can explain the latter. The answer seems to be that the former caused the latter, and it
is in virtue of its causing it that it can explain it.8 From the point of view of analyzing rationalization,
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we must understand what it is about reasons that allows them to rationalize actions. From the
foregoing brief discussion of how rationalization works in everyday contexts, it is clear that the
explanatory relation holding between the reason and the action must have some sort of justificatory
component. The rationalizer must come to see the agent’s action as, in some sense, justified by her
reason for action. It would clearly be very problematic to construe rationalization just as
justification, or in other words, to claim that the reason explains precisely because it justifies the
action. This is because there are reasons that do not objectively justify actions, but nevertheless
rationalize them. Opening the window to cool the room in spite of the fact that it is hotter outside
than inside is a case in point. Consequently, we must accommodate both the justificatory aspects of
the relation that holds between the reason and the action and the fact that «bad reasons», reasons
that do not objectively justify actions, may nevertheless rationalize them perfectly well. 
A distinction between «normative reasons» and «motivating reasons» is often thought to help
with this problem.9 Normative reasons are taken to have objective normative force and they are
taken to justify actions. Motivating reasons motivate the agent to act in one way or another, and they
may or may not have objective normative force. They nevertheless «motivate» the agent to act, and
we can talk about the agent’s reasons without committing ourselves to any claim about whether or
not the action is objectively justified. However, motivating reasons are not devoid of normative con-
tent, and are, presumably, rationally intelligible. 
Motivating reasons have proven very difficult to understand, so it is not at all clear what the
foregoing shift amounts to. For our purposes, we will confine ourselves to an examination of one
view of rationalization that relies on motivating reasons, and we will eschew the much more
difficult task of trying to understand motivating reasons as they are presented throughout the
literature. This view to be examined is that of Donald Davidson in «Actions, Reasons and Causes».
In this paper, he takes a motivating reason to be at least the combination of a pro-attitude and a
belief.10 Davidson claims that an intentional action is explained, not just by any combination of pro-
attitude and belief, but is explained by a primary reason composed of a pro-attitude and belief that
is constrained in the following way:
C1: R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description d only
if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards actions with a certain property, and a belief
of the agent that A, under the description d, has that property.11
I take Davidson’s position in «Actions, Reasons and Causes» to be that a reason that conforms to
C1 and is causally efficacious in producing an intentional action is a reason that can rationalize an
intentional action. The added requirement that a reason that conforms to C1 must also be causally
efficacious in the production of the action arises from what has become known as Davidson’s cha-
llenge. In «Actions, Reasons and Causes» Davidson challenges the non-causalist to be able to dis-
tinguish between the reasons for action that the agent may have had but for which the agent did not
act, and the reason or reasons for which the agent ultimately acted. Davidson’s view is that it is the
causal efficacy in the production of action that distinguishes the reason or reasons for which the
9 See Dancy, 2000, for a penetrating discussion of the distinction.
10 Davidson, 1963; James Dreier says «Motivating reasons are psychologically real … A motivating reason that you have
is an empirical property that you bear …» Dreier, 2001. See also Michael Smith, 1987, 1998.
11 Davidson, 1963, p. 5. 
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agent acted from the reason or reasons for action that the agent had but didn’t act on. Hence, he
argues that C1 must be bolstered by a further condition, C2.
C2: A primary reason for an action is its cause.12
At this point, two questions arise. First, if we adopt the view that rationalizations are
tracking motivating reasons, what feature or features of those reasons are doing the explanatory
work in rationalization? Second, given our assumption that rationalization renders intentional
actions rationally intelligible, can we capture this fact about rationalizations with our analysis
of rationalization in terms of motivating reasons construed as Davidson construes them?
Davidson has a ready answer to the first question, namely, the reason explains the action
because it causes it.13 As for the second question, I will argue that Davidson fails to preserve
this feature of rationalization.14
Let us consider the following rather bizarre case of Sally. Suppose that Sally wants to alleviate
her thirst and has the belief that opening the window is a means to alleviating her thirst. We can
then construct a primary reason using this desire and belief that conforms to C1. In addition, we
can stipulate that it is causally efficacious. According to Davidson’s 1963 view, this reason
rationalizes Sally’s action of opening the window because it satisfies the necessary and sufficient
conditions (C1 and C2) on being the «reason for which» the agent acts. However, when we put
ourselves in the position of a rationalizer who wants to know why Sally is opening the window,
being told that she is alleviating her thirst or attempting to alleviate her thirst in this action does
not make her action rationally intelligible. Indeed, we can imagine ourselves being very
bewildered in such a case. This suggests that Davidson’s conditions on intentional action and the
reason for which are not sufficient for specifying the conditions in which a reason for which an
agent acts is sufficient to rationalize that action. Specifically, it seems clear that the assumption
that rationalization makes actions rationally intelligible is violated if we take C1 and C2 to be both
necessary and sufficient for a reason that rationalizes an action.
Let’s call the case of Sally’s reason, which conforms to Davidson’s C1 and C2, and thus
should, by Davidson’s lights, be sufficient to rationalize her action of window-opening, the
«crazy reason» problem (as opposed to the «bad reasons» problem alluded to above, wherein we
must accommodate reasons that rationalize although they don’t objectively justify actions). The
idea behind the «crazy reason» problem is just that motivating reasons are taken to be empirically
real psychological states of the agent, which don’t obviously have features that preclude their
arrangement in a rationally incoherent fashion.15 If it is possible to have a primary reason such as
Sally’s, then a tension arises between assuming that rationalization makes actions rationally
intelligible and holding that motivating reasons rationalize intentional actions. It seems that we
must either find a constraint on motivating reasons or we must give up our assumption that
rationalization makes actions rationally intelligible. As the assumption is not just something that
12 Davidson, 1963, p. 12.
13 Dreier and others point out that tracking motivating reasons does not entail tracking causal relations, but it is also a little
obscure what else we could be tracking. See Dreier (1997).
14 This claim is not novel, of course, but my argument for it is different from those in the literature that I am aware of. 
15 I take the rational constraints on belief desire pairs that arise in Davidson’s interpretationism to be the result of epistemic
constraints on the interpreter and the interpreted that do not derive from the metaphysical nature of the actual psycholo-
gical states of the agent in question. I am here taking Davidson’s interpretationism and his action theory separately.
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Davidson appears to subscribe to, but is reflected in everyday cases of rationalization16, it is not
the obvious candidate for abandonment.
The Problem with the Move to Motivating Reasons
The introduction of «motivating reasons» was meant to capture the power of reasons in
rationalization to render actions rationally intelligible while factoring in the detachment from the
objective normative force of those reasons. On Davidson’s version of this outlook, the feature of
rationalization that is that it makes actions rationally intelligible is not preserved. Indeed, it seems
that we face a dilemma: either reasons that objectively justify actions rationalize them, in which
case we are without an account of reasons that rationalize although they lack justificatory force (the
«bad reasons» problem), or motivating reasons rationalize, in which case rationalization is no
longer constrained by a rational intelligibility requirement (the «crazy reasons» problem). 
Section 2: The Relegation of Causation
How then are we to resolve the dilemma that we face? In the following section, I will urge that
we tread a particular path to our solution, but as aforementioned, what I say will not amount to
either a full solution to the problem raised. 
The notion of motivating reasons is a disputed one, and I have not, so far, devoted time to
exploring the possibilities for fleshing it out. My main aim has been to criticize the Davidsonian
view, which fails to show how we can constrain motivating reasons to secure a full analysis of
rationalization. A pertinent consideration is that if we were, in an everyday context, to be told that
Sally was opening the window to alleviate her thirst, we would be likely to embark upon an
exploration of Sally’s background beliefs to try to understand why she thinks that window-opening
is a good means to her end. For example, if we were told that Sally believes that in opening the
window she sends a signal to someone to send her a drink of water, we may come to see why Sally
thought that she was rationally justified in doing what she did. Of course, we may not believe of
many of Sally’s beliefs that they are true, but it would be possible for us to reconstruct her
reasoning, or, if you like, the rational outlook that she had on her action. We could thereby make
her action rationally intelligible to us. 
In light of this fact, we might amend Davidson’s C1 to reflect this holistic character of
rationalization by, for example, stipulating that in cases where rational intelligibility does not result
from coming to know what the causally efficacious primary reason was, we can proceed to enquire
into background beliefs and desires to complete the process of rationalization. What does this tell
us about the nature of rationalization? First, it reinforces the point already made about Sally’s
«crazy reason» case, namely, that we must see the action as, in some sense, justified, if we are to
rationalize it. Second, it shows that whatever the metaphysical character of motivating reasons, if
they are to qualify for the role of explanans in rationalization, they must be able to play a
justificatory role, not only as adequate, albeit subjective, justifications for actions, but as part of a
potentially large network of justificatory relations that feed the rational support that an agent may
have for any given action. In light of this, the poverty of the purely causalist approach to motivating
Daimon. Revista de Filosofía, nº 37, 2006
16 For example, in the crazy reason case, we would typically be dissatisfied with the «answer». In fact, we would typically
refuse to let the matter rest and begin enquiring into the agent’s other beliefs to try to discern why they did what they did. 
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17 I discuss this elsewhere in much greater detail in «A Non-Causalist Theory of Rationalization», Brown Unviersity Ph.D.
dissertation, May 2006.
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reasons in Davidson’s analysis seems clear, and strongly suggests that we must accommodate the
«bad reasons» problem without appeal to causation. This is not yet a refutation of causalism with
respect to rationalization, as there may still be some explanatory role left for causation. In the
following, I will urge a skepticism about such a possibility. I will briefly discuss belief
rationalization as a potential model on which to understand action rationalization. It recommends
itself as a model because it has many commonalities with the rationalization of action, and it
appears to accommodate «bad reasons» without appeal to causation. 
When we wish to rationalize an agent’s belief, we may enquire into her justification for her
belief in an effort to understand it. As with the rationalization of action, it may require an
examination of a large number of the agent’s background beliefs and the justificatory relations that
she takes to hold among them. In both cases the aim is to understand the rational intelligibility of
the agent, and in neither case is the rationalizer committed to the objectivity of the agent’s
justification. Both processes accommodate «bad reasons». True, in one case we rationalize an
agent’s belief and in the other we rationalize her action. However, what seems crucial to this latter
project is that we understand the rationality of the agent’s action in light of her judgment that the
action is «the thing to do». Consequently, in both cases it seems that we are assessing the rationality
of a judgment of the agent’s, and thus, the difference does not seem to be of great import. 
It is interesting that, in spite of such a strong similarity between the two types of
rationalization, it is not suggested of the rationalization of beliefs that it is a type of causal
explanation, nor is it suggested that an appeal to causation would provide a solution to the problem
of understanding rationalization of beliefs in the case of «bad reasons» for belief. And yet,
Davidson’s challenge seems to be equally applicable here. After all, what is the difference between
the reasons for belief that the agent had, and the reasons for which she ultimately formed the
belief? If there is no philosophically significant difference between the types of rationalization,
why has Davidson’s challenge not been applied to the process of belief formation? I think that the
reason for this is that everyday rationalization is a practice in which the rationalizer simply
assumes that the agent fulfills the causal conditions on being an epistemic agent. If this is right, it
seems that rationalization of belief is a process that presupposes certain facts about the causal
order, specifically those facts concerning whether or not the rationalizer’s deliberation is causally
efficacious in the production of beliefs. If it is a presupposition of the enquiry that the causal order
is a certain way, then the enquiry cannot be concerned with tracking and describing that part of the
causal order.17 If this picture of belief-rationalization is roughly correct, it seems to combine a
focus on the justificatory features of reasons while accommodating «bad reasons», and it seems to
do this without appeal to causation. 
The foregoing is a rough and speculative picture of how belief-rationalization works, and much
more needs to be said to flesh it out. However, what it suggests is that, given the similarities
between the rationalization of actions and beliefs, and given, as I hope to have established in the
earlier part of the paper, the prominence of the justificatory aspect of «motivating reasons» in the
rationalization of action, we should attempt to resolve our dilemma, not by giving up on rational
intelligibility and embracing causalism, nor by ignoring the fact that causalism does not explain
rational intelligibility, but by looking at the rationalization of belief as a potential source of insight
into the nature of the rationalization of action. Belief-rationalization seems to prioritize the tracking
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of justificatory relations, while accommodating «bad reasons» and it also seems to relegate
causation to the presuppositions of the rationalizing enquiry. Even if we are at a loss to fully
understand the process of rationalization in the case of beliefs, it does present itself as a starting
point for a resolution to the problem of accommodating justification in rationalization. 
Conclusión
I have not attempted to offer either an analysis of rationalization, or a solution to the problem
posed by the dilemma above. My aims have been to highlight the prominent place of justification
in rationalization, and to establish the poverty of Davidson’s approach in light of this. What I am
proposing is that we take the case of belief rationalization as an interesting place to start in trying
to understand the nature of the rationalization of actions. It suggests itself because it appears to
accommodate the prominent place of justificatory relations, the problem of «bad reasons» and it
seems to do so without relying on causation. 
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